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SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
CoIMMAN KARESH*
The subject of Security Transactions does not this year nor -Will
it in future years cover security transactions affecting chattels
or other personal property. Chattel transactions are now and
will be included under the heading of Commercial Transactions.
The subject under review will include real property security
transactions and suretyship, except insofar as the latter may in-
volve problems arising in connection with negotiable paper.
There are no strict suretyship cases for the period under review
except a Federal Court of Appeals casea which, while arising in
South Carolina, involves no application of South Carolina sure-
tyship law.
ABSOLUTE DEED INTENDED AS MORTGAGE
Another of the frequently recurring cases in which attempt is
made to have an absolute deed established as a mortgage is Brit-
ton v. Amos.' The complaint sought, in the language of the
opinion, "to have a deed, absolute on its face, declared a mort-
gage on the ground that it was frauduently obtained," and also
sought actual and punitive damages for alleged wrongful cutting
of timber.
The plaintiff in 1936 had conveyed the land in suit to the tes-
tator of the defendants, and at the same time the grantee ob-
tained a deed from the Forfeited Land Commission, which had
acquired it on sale for non-payment of taxes.
After testimony by the plaintiff that he had been told by the
grantee that he was signing a deed to "the bird rights," and
other testimony, the presiding judge ordered a non-suit. In his
order, the judge noted that there was no contention that the
parties actually intended the deed to be a mortgage, and that
there was no evidence that there was any understanding that the
deed was to be security for any loans or advances made or to be
made. "In short," it was concluded, "plaintiff's case falls short
of the degree of proof necessary to establish that the deed in
question was a mortgage."
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
a. United States v. Five Boro Corp., 310 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1962).
1. 241 S.C. 336, 128 S.E,2d 161 (1962). This case is also noted in the
Property section at note 22.
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The Supreme Court affirmed. It took note of the presumption
that an absolute deed is what it purports to be and that the proof
required to establish a deed as a mortgage must be clear, un-
equivocal and convincing. The presumption in this case was not
overcome, the requisite proof not having been produced. As is
usual in such cases, there was attention to the adequacy of the
consideration for the transfer, and here the court concluded that
there was nothing to show that the grantee had not paid the "full
depression value" of the land.
The case would be another of the ordinary run-of-the-mill type
were it not for the fact that while the case was disposed of as if
it were the usual absolute deed-mortgage controversy, the thrust
of the plaintiff's complaint and of his evidence was limited to
showing that he had been deceived as to the contents of the in-
strument he was signing. That ground of attack on a deed is
not the same as seeking to show that a deed-known to be such-
was intended as security-a distinction sometimes not observed
but which has been clearly pointed out by the court.2 Apparent-
ly in this case, both below and on appeal, the court indulgently
permitted the plaintiff to pursue the inconsistent courses of show-
ing mistake or fraud as to the contents of the instrument and
intention to treat the deed as security.
Another ground of appeal by the losing plaintiff was the al-
leged error on the part of the trial judge in refusing a motion
to try the case as one in equity and submit only specific questions
to the jury. The Supreme Court observed that as stated in the
complaint the second cause of action-for damages for cutting of
timber-was susceptible of the construction that it stated an
action at law rather than one in equity. It was not until later,
during the course of the trial that it appeared that the plaintiff
sought recovery on that cause of action on an equitable theory-
that the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee still existed
and that the removal of the timber was therefore the subject of
an accounting rather than an ordinary action for trespass. The
court concluded that even if the trial judge was in error in not
treating the matter as one in equity-and error did not clearly
appear-any such error would have been without prejudice to the
2. White v. Livingston, 231 S.C. 301, 98 S.E.2d 534 (1957); White v.
Livingston, 234 S.C. 74, 106 S.E.2d 892 (1959). At times the two situations
seem to run together or not to be differentiated. Cf. Howard v. Steen, 230 S.C.
251, 95 S.E.2d 613 (1956). It is not necessary in order to establish a deed as
a mortgage that there be a showing of fraud, mistake or undue influence.
Brickle v. Leach, 55 S.C. 510, 33 S.E. 720 (1899).
1963]
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plaintiff's right. The circuit judge having correctly decided that
the plaintiff failed to prove his alleged causes of action, it was
"immaterial whether he decided such as a judge sitting in Equity,
or decided such by an order of nonsuit." Having heard all the
evidence, his decision, on the merits in one capacity or the other,
would not be affected.
3
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-VALIDITY
In Carsten v. WisoVn, 4 an action for foreclosure, two issues
arose: (1) the validity of the mortgage, and (2) the validity of
the sale.
On the first issue the named defendant contended that the
mortgage, which had been given by his father, was without con-
sideration, and that the mortgagor was illiterate and unable to
understand the contents of the mortgage. The named defendant
was grantee of his father (who had since died) and in the trans-
fer had assumed the payment of the mortgage. The referee held
adversely to the defendant, and was sustained by the circuit
judge, both concluding that the mortgagor had sufficient mental
capacity and that there was neither want nor failure of consider-
3. It seems reasonably plain that this action-from the outset and during
trial-was in its nature equitable, whether the action was one to set aside the
deed for fraud or to have the deed declared a mortgage, particularly the latter;
and the denomination of the relief sought for cutting of timber as damages in
trespass rather than accounting for waste, would not seem to be important.
Although the doctrine of "once a mortgage always a mortgage" originated in
equity, it has been the law for a long time that parol evidence is admissible
in an action at law to establish that a deed was intended as a mortgage. Where
the grantor is the plaintiff, seeking to fasten the character of a mortgage upon
a deed, clearly the action throughout is equitable. The typical law case is one
in which the grantee seeks ejectment and is met with the defense that the
deed was a mortgage. Brownlee v. Martin, 21 S.C. 392 (1884); Brownlee v.
Martin, 28 S.C. 364, 6 S.E. 148 (1887) ; Banks v. Frith, 97 S.C. 362, 81 S.E.
627 (1913) ; Middleton v. Levy, 106 S.C. 32, 90 S.E. 325 (1916) ; Stackhouse
v. Stanton, 179 S.C. 506, 184 S.E. 105 (1936); Evans v. Evans, 226 S.C. 451,
85 S.E.2d 726 (1955). Parol evidence of the nature of the transaction was
admissible in all these cases. In other law cases not involving ejectment parol
evidence has likewise been acceptable. Welborn v. Dixon, 70 S.C. 108, 49 S.E.
232 (1904) (damages for breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act in
grantee's conveying to another); Brown v. Insurance Co., 179 S.C. 274, 184
S.E. 670 (1935) (action on fire policy, defended on ground that insured had
conveyed property away, insured allowed to show deed was intended as mort-
gage); Williams v. Griffin, 58 S.C. 370, 36 S.E. 665 (1900) (claim and de-
livery, plaintiff allowed to show that absolute bill of sale had been intended
as security and debt had been paid). What is not so clear, particularly in
the ejectment cases, is whether the contention that the deed was in reality a
mortgage raised an equitable issue which was to be separately tried without a
jury. On the whole it would seem that the issues thus raised in these law
cases would, if a party insisted, be triable separately. As raising the deed-mort-
gage plea in an action in Magistrate's Court to evict, see Lewis v. Cooley, 81
S.C. 461, 62 S.E. 868 (1908).
4. 241 S.C. 516, 129 S.E.2d 431 (1963).
[Vol. 16
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ation.5 There were no exceptions to the report of the referee or
to the trial judge's affirming decree ordering foreclosure.
The Supreme Court observed that, in view of the failure to
except to the referee's report, it could not properly consider
questions not so raised, and that since the proceeding to fore-
close was in equity it could not disturb the concurrent findings of
the referee and the trial judge unless such findings were "with-
out any evidence to support them or against the clear preponder-
ance of the evidence." The court nevertheless, eco gratia, consider-
ed the exceptions and concluded that the evidence was ample to
uphold the findings below.
The second issue raised by the named defendant was that the
trial judge erred in refusing to set aside the foreclosure sale be-
cause of failure of the plaintiff to furnish bond following de-
fendant's notice of appeal-the contention being that on failure
to give bond upon such notice the sale was, or should have been,
stayed. The defendant relied upon Section 7-412 of the Code.
The court dismissed this contention, since that statute relates to
the requirement of bond by a judgment creditor seeking sale
after levy where the debtor has appealed. The statute was mani-
festly inapplicable in this case. The appropriate section covering
appeals in foreclosure actions, the court pointed out, is Section
7-417 of the Code which provides, on the contrary, that sale is
not stayed unless the appellant furnishes bond. Hence in this
case, the defendant's failure to furnish bond deprived him of a
stay.
ASSUMPTION OF MORTGAGE-
LIABILITY TO GRANTOR
The usual case of the assumption of a mortgage debt is one in
which the mortgagee sues the assuming grantee. The less usual
one is that in which the grantor sues the grantee. The latter
situation is presented in Jones v. Bates." The facts are relatively
simple. In brief, the plaintiff Jones gave a note and mortgage
which were assigned to John Hancock Insurance Company. As
5. It would appear that since the defendant, the grantee, had assumed the
payment of the mortgage, he should not have been allowed to assert its in-
validity, either because of estoppel or by reason of third-party beneficiary
contract principles which generally deny the promisor the right to set up
against the beneficiary defenses that the promisee has against the beneficiary. See
OSBCRNE, MORTGAGES § 267 (1951); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.138
(Casner ed. 1952); annot., 21 A.L.R. 439, 490 (1922); RESTATEmENT, CON-
TRACTS § 144 (1932); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 399 (3d ed. 1959). Cf. Bank
v. Campbell, 2 Rich. Eq. 179 (S.C. 1846).
6. 241 S.C. 189, 127 S.E.2d 618 (1962).
19631
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part of the loan transaction the plaintiff procured for the mort-
gagee the guaranty of the Veterans Administration, to which he
gave the usual indemnification agreement. Thereafter Jones sold
the mortgaged property to the defendant Bates, who assumed
payment of the mortgage. Subsequently Bates sold to Ault, who
likewise assumed payment. Finally Ault sold to the Bennetts
who in turn assumed payment. The Bennetts defaulted in their
payments and the assignee brought action to foreclose the mort-
gage, making the Bennetts but none of the earlier owners parties.
The assignee waived any deficiency, having first obtained the
consent of the Veterans Administration to do so.1 There was no
competitive bidding and the property was bought in by the as-
signee for a nominal sum. The property was thereafter appraised
by the assignee and it was ascertained that the debt exceeded
the value of the property by $957.95. The assignee called upon
the Veterans Administration for payment of this amount, and
payment was made. The Veterans Administration then sought
payment from Jones, the plaintiff here. Jones made arrange-
ment to make small monthly payments and had made a few
when he brought this action against Bates for the amount which
he claimed he owed the Veterans Administration.
The principal defenses were (1) that the defendant was not
bound by the agreement of indemnity between Jones and the
Veterans Administration; (2) that there was no damage sustained
by the plaintiff, since he had not actually paid the Veterans Ad-
ministration the full amount of its claim; (3) that the defendant
was not liable because of waiver of the deficiency by the holder of
the mortgage.
Both the court below and the Supreme Court held the de-
fendant liable for the amount sued for. The Supreme Court's
major holding was that on an assumption by a grantee, he comes
under liability to both the grantor and to the mortgagee-a pro-
position familiar enough in the area of third-party beneficiary
contracts, into which assumption agreements fall.8 The court
7. The waiver was obviously under S.C. CODE § 10-1774 (1952) [S.C. CODE
§ 10-1774 (1962)] which permits an immediate closing of sale where deficiency
is waived, rather than a protracted 30-day bidding under §§ 10-1770 through
10-1773. These statutes are more fully dealt with hereafter.
8. RESTATEmENT, CONTRaCTS § 136 (1932) "Duties Created By a Promise
to Discharge a Duty. (1) xxx (b) a promise to discharge the promisee's
duty creates also a duty to the promisee;" 2 WILLIsTON, op. cit. supra note 5,
§ 392; annot, 21 A.L.R. 439 (1922). The theory that a mortgagee, whose
debt has been assumed by a grantee, is a third-party beneficiary is the ac-
cepted one in South Carolina-South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Kohn, 108 S.C. 475,
95 S.E. 65 (1917) (cited by the court); First Carolinas Joint Stock Lan 1
Bank v. DuBose, 181 S.C. 40, 186 S.E. 514 (1936).
[Vol. 16
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further observed that the mortgagor could not divest himself of
his liability by any transfer.9 Having determined that the gran-
tee, Bates, was liable to Jones on her promise, the court declared
that the plaintiff might sue the defendant without having first
paid the debt, since the contract was that the debt would be paid
and was not one to indemnify or reimburse the grantor after
he had paid, i.e. the action was for breach of contract and not
for reimbursement. 10
Turning to the question of the amount of damages recoverable,
the court resorted to a general rule of damages that "in action
for breach of contract actual damages may be recovered to the
extent of such damage as naturally, directly and proximately
results therefrom .... ,,11 The court continued, "The plaintiff,
however, is only entitled to actual damages sufficient to put him
in the same position as he would have been if the contract had
9. Citing Harris v. Rice, 131 S.C. 171, 126 S.E. 754 (1924). See, in addi-
tion, Scott v. Stone, 149 S.C. 386, 147 S.E. 449 (1928); Mortgage Co. v.
Townsend, 156 S.C. 203, 152 S.E. 878 (1930); Hibbet v. Charleston Heights
Co., 163 S.C. 327, 161 S.E. 499 (1931). The assumption does not constitute
a novation discharging the mortgagor unless the creditor discharges the mort-
gagor and accepts the assuming grantee as the sole debtor. Callaham v. Ridge-
way, 138 S.C. 10, 135 S.E. 646 (1926) ; Scott v. Stone, supra.
10. Again the problem is one of third-party beneficiary and also one of surety-
ship. The remedy of a promisee against his promisor, who has made a contract
with him for the benefit of the former's creditor, is not limited to reimburse-
ment-although he has that implied right, as well as other rights both before
and after payment, such as exoneration in the first instance and subrogation
in the latter. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 141 (1932) ; Latimer v. Latimer, 38
S.C. 339, 16 S.E. 995 (1892) (reimbursement); Dunn v. Chapman, 149 S.C.
163, 146 S.E. 818 (1928) (subrogation); Redfeam v. Craig, 57 S.C. 534, 35
S.E. 1024 (1899) (exoneration). These are all mortgage cases. The cases in
strict suretyship applying these principles are too numerous for mention. A
mortgagor who transfers to an assuming grantee becomes surety and the latter
becomes the principal. Latimer v. Latimer, supra; Scott v. Stone, supra;
Mortgage Loan Co. v. Townsend, supra. This being the relation, it would
follow that the mortgagor, as surety, would have all the rights that the con-
ventional surety has before or after payment. The surety's right of indemnity
or reimbursement is well-recognized; but it is equally well-recognized that
where the principal makes a direct promise to the surety, the surety can sue
upon the promise immediately upon its being broken and without payment by
the surety as a condition precedent. Thus in numerous cases it has been held
that where a principal gives his surety a bond or other security for the prin-
cipal's performance, the surety, on breach by the principal, may sue or fore-
close without prior payment by him to the creditor. Ramsay v. Gervais, 2 Bay
145 (S.C. 1798) ; Tankersley v. Anderson, 4 Des. 44 (S.C. 1809) ; Bellune v.
Wallace, 2 Rich. L. 80 (S.C. 1845); Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 S.C. 110
(1880) ; Beasley v. Newell, 40 S.C. 16, 18 S.E. 224 (1892). Of course if the
undertaking of the principal to the surety is that the principal is to refund
or reimburse the surety for what he may have to pay, an action on the under-
taking or its security cannot be maintained until the surety has paid. Mc-
Donald v. Bauskett, 10 Rich. L. 178 (S.C. 1856) ; Doyle v. Jones, 176 S.C. 429,
180 S.E. 451 (1935).
11. Quoting from Stevenson v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 176 S.C. 345, 180
S.E. 197 (1935).
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been fulfilled. He should be completely exonerated by his grantee
from the obligation which the grantee had assumed.... It has
been determined that plaintiff's loss is $957.95 .... ,,12
Neither in the court below nor on appeal was serious consider-
ation given to the contention of the defendant that she was not
liable on the basis of the indemnity agreement between the plain-
tiff and the Veterans Administration which, she urged, was an
independent agreement that did not affect her. The trial judge
(sitting without a jury) limited himself to stating "It appears
to be conceded by the parties hereto that the defendant well
knew that the mortgage which she was assuming in the deed
from the plaintiff was a veteran's loan mortgage, and therefore,
the mortgagee was indemnified by the Veterans Administration,
which, in turn, would be entitled to call upon the veteran to pay
any loss sustained by it." While affirming the decree, and noting
the argument that the indemnity agreement did not apply to the
grantee without her express assumption of it, the Supreme Court
made no further allusion to or recognition of it. It was perhaps
unnecessary, since the court's major premise was that the defend-
ant's liability was based not on a promise to pay the plaintiff
whatever he had to pay the Veterans Administration but on her
promise to the plaintiff to pay what he owed the mortgagee-
and it was this promise which was broken. Collaterally, it may
be pointed out that whether the agreement between the plaintiff
12. There is some sympathy for and merit in the defendant's contention that
until the plaintiff is out of pocket, he has suffered no loss. Too, he might stand
the risk of double payment, since, as assuming grantee, he would be liable to
the mortgagee, and his payment to the mortgagor would not be payment to
the mortgagee. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 136(1) (d) (1932) ; 2 WILLISTON,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 392; Heinz v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350, 219 N.W. 287
(1928). The risk can obviously be avoided by the grantee's paying the mort-
gagee first, or the grantee can seek an injunction against the grantor's pro-
ceeding with the action "on terms of payment of the debt to the mortgagee."
2 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 5, § 392. There seems to be narrower and
more precise authority fixing the damages in cases of this kind than the general,
all-pervasive rule of such damages as flow from breach of contract. The rule
appears to be that damages are the amount of the debt which the promisor-
the grantee--has agreed to pay to the promisee's creditor. "In mortgage cases,
the promisor may thus find himself in a difficult position between the mort-
gagee and the promisee, the grantor of the premises. If the promisor fails to
keep his promise to pay the debt, he is liable to the promisee for the full
amount of the debt, even though the latter has not yet paid it. Unless the
promise can have the interpretation of a promise to indemnify against loss, this
seems sound." 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 5 § 392, citing numerous cases. See,
also, Annot., 21 A.L.R. 504, 525 (1922), and supplements. That the amount
of the debt would be the measure of recovery seems to be the local law as
appears in Hellams v. Abercrombie, 15 S.C. 110 (1880), where a surety who
had been given a mortgage as security was held entitled t fnreelo- f'r the
amount of the debt for which he was surety upon the mortgagor's failure to
pay the creditor.
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and the Veterans Administration was independent or not, or
whether the grantee was or was not charged with it, the Veterans
Administration as surety or guarantor would, on payment to the
mortgagee, be subrogated not only to the mortgagee's rights
against the mortgagor but to the mortgagee's rights against the
assuming grantee as well. Since the mortgagee could sue the
grantee, the guarantor, by subrogation, could sue the grantee
after payment.12a All this of course assumes that subrogation
would not be denied for some other reason.
The final objection of the defendant was given even less con-
sideration by the trial judge and by the Supreme Court. Aside
from mentioning the contention of the defendant "that the waiver
of a deficiency judgment in the foreclosure proceeding releases
her," the latter court took no other notice of it. Yet it would
seem that the objection would be a most vital, if not a successful
one, since it involves not only the meaning but also the policy
of the "moratorium" laws of the 1930's regulating foreclosure
proceedings. 13 The plaintiff's position regarding the defendant's
objection was that the mortgagee, even though it had waived de-
ficiency in its pleadings, could thereafter sue on the debt for
the deficiency. 14 This prompted a reply brief in which the de-
fendant controverted this position 15 with the additional assertion
in effect that the policy of the statutes would be subverted by
permitting continuance of personal liability in the face of the
waiver of deficiency sanctioned and regulated by the statutes. 16
12a. "His [the surety's] right of subrogation also extends to . . . his [the
creditor's] right as beneficiary against a third person who promised the prin-
cipal he would pay his debt." SImPsoN, SuRErYsIP § 47 (1950). As to
subrogation to the creditor's rights against persons other than the principal,
see Rhame v. Lewis, 13 Rich. Eq. 269, 330 (S.C. 1867); Rivers v. Liberty
Nat'l Bank, 135 S.C. 107, 133 S.E. 210 (1926); American Sur. Co. v. Hamrick
Mills, 191 S.C. 362, 4 S.E.2d 308 (1939) ; American Sur. Co. v. Hamrick Mills,
194 S.C. 221, 9 S.E.2d 433 (1940). Subrogation against an assuming grantee
can also be worked out on the basis of succession to the rights of the mort-
gagor (principal). "A surety is subrogated to such rights and remedies as the
principal has in connection with the debt which will afford him a means of
reimbursement." 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 57 (1953) ; and see 60 C.J. Subro-
gation § 81 (1932) (p 771, n.K) "A surety will be subrogated to the principal's
right of action against a third person who has assumed and agreed to pay
the debt." Cf. Ex parte Reynolds, 68 S.C. 436, 47 S.E. 728 (1903).
13. S.C. CODE §§ 45-88 through 45-96.1 (1955, 1962), permitting defendant
against whom personal judgment is taken or asked to obtain appraisal, which
may cut down or eliminate deficiency; §§ 10-1770 through 10-1773, keeping
bidding open for thirty days after sale; § 10-1774, making these last sections in-
applicable "if the complaint therein states that no personal or deficiency judg-
inent is demanded and that any right to such judgment is expressly waived"
(emphasis supplied).
14. Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11.
15. Reply Brief, pp. 3-5.
16. Reply Brief, pp. 6-7.
1963]
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There is much to be said for the defendant's position on both
counts. Unquestionably, leaving aside the "moratorium" statutes,
a mortgagee could sue in foreclosure without asking for a money
judgment, and having obtained a decree of sale which resulted in
a deficiency he could thereafter bring an action at law to recover
the amount of the deficiency.17 The practice, however, almost
invariably has been to seek both personal judgment and fore-
closure in the same equitable proceeding, the earlier form allow-
ing judgment only after the deficiency has been ascertained fol-
lowing sale, and the later and more recent form to seek a decree
ordering a personal judgment and foreclosure sale with the judg-
ment effective immediately and carrying over to embrace the
defeciency to which it had been reduced by the sale.18 With the
advent of the "moratorium" laws, waiver of the deficiency-
abstention from seeking personal judgment-has become the pre-
vailing practice for reasons which the statutes themselves compel,
and the accompanying prayer for judgment on the debt has be-
come the exception.
Conceding that in theory a mortgagee might sue to foreclose
without at the same time seeking a personal judgment, there is a
difference between not asking for a deficiency judgment and
17. Gray v. Toomer, 5 Rich. L. 261 (S.C. 1852).
18. The latter practice is authorized by statute, enacted in 1894. 21 Stat
816, now S.C. CODE §§ 45-85, 45-86 (1962). Neither the statute nor the earlier
practice rules out separate actions at law and in equity, but if the foreclosure
action asks for personal judgment action at law is not permitted. Anderson v.
Pilgrim, 30 S.C. 499, 19 S.E. 1002 (1888), holding also that "strict foreclosure,"
i.e., barring the right to redeem unless the debt is paid by a stated date, where-
upon the mortgagee acquires absolute title does not obtain in this state. Except
in a very narrow range of cases, foreclosure can be only by sale. For history
of the practice in foreclosure and its relation to rendition of personal judgment,
see McConnell v. Barnes, 142 S.C. 112, 140 S.E. 310 (1927). It appears to be
established that an action at law on the debt, resulting in a judgment, would
not bar a subsequent action to foreclose. The effect of obtaining the judg-
ment is not to extinguish the debt which the mortgage secures but to bring
about the representation of the debt in a new form-the judgment. Annot., 121
A.L.R. 917 (1939); Satterwhite v. Kennedy, 3 Strob. L. 457 (S.C. 1849)
(dictum) ; McClure v. Wheeler, 6 Rich. Eq. 343 (S.C. 1854) ; American Trust
Co. v. Doig, 23 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1928). There are cases where, although
foreclosure is available, a personal judgment is not. (This is not "strict fore-
closure.") It is not a matter of waiver but of unavailability. For example, the
mortgagor-owner may be a non-resident (and not actually within the state);
or he may have received a discharge in bankruptcy; or action on the debt may
be barred by lapse of time; or the note or bond may have been altered without
the mortgagor's consent (Heath v. Blake, 28 S.C. 406, 5 S.E. 842 (1887)).
The list is not all-inclusive. It is interesting to note that having made only the
last owner a party, omitting prior owners, including the mortgagor, who were
liable for the debt, the mortgagee could not have obtained a personal judg-
ment if it had wanted or asked for one. The owners who were parties in the
action of Joh, Hancock Ins. Co. v. Bennett, were non-residents of the state,
or at least were served outside of it. Transcript of Record, pp. 7-8.
[Vol. 16
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expressly waiving it, as the language of the statute has it.19 It
would seem in any event, however, that the "moratorium" laws
have put an end to the rule or practice which permitted a non-
judgment foreclosure to be followed by an action at law for the
deficiency. Considering the purpose of these statutes, all of
which are to be taken as making up a single package, and taking
into account the clear legislative design to keep a mortgagee from
having his cake and eating it too, it would be reasonable to as-
sume that a waiver of deficiency would be just what it purports
to be-not merely refraining from asking for judgment but af-
firmatively giving it up. The statute itself (Section 10-1774)
couples the negative conjunctively with the waiver.19a The mort-
gagee who does not waive the deficiency subjects himself to the
hazards of unclosed bidding and statutory appraisal; he avoids
these risks in return for the waiver. To hold that even though
he waives the deficiency he may afterwards pursue the debtor
at law would be to make the statutes meaningless and self.de-
feating. In a case uncomplicated by subsequent transfers and as-
sumptions and by the presence of G.I. guaranty, if waiver did
not preclude personal resort the mortgagee could sue to fore-
close, waive the deficiency, have the mortgage property sold for
an amount which might produce a large deficiency without re-
gard to the value of the property-all this without exposure to
unclosed bidding and statutory appraisal-and thereafter sue at
law for the deficiency. Of course the policy of the statutes could
not or should not be frustrated in this fashion. And on principle
it would seem that just as the mortgagee should not be allowed
to pursue in this way a mortgagor who had not disposed of the
property, he should not be allowed, after similar foreclosure
against the ultimate owner, to pursue the mortgagor who had
conveyed away the property or any intermediate grantees.2 0 As
19. See note 13 supra.
19a. See note 13 supra.
20. It must be admitted that there are gaps in the statutes. Take a case
where the mortgagor has conveyed to a non-assuming grantee. The latter can,
of course, be sued alone as could an assuming grantee, as was done in this
case. S.C. CODE § 45-82 (1962) (probably largely declaratory of the law);
Wright v. Eaves, 10 Rich. Eq. 582 (S.C. 1858) ; Butler v. Williams, 27 S.C.
221, 3 S.E. 211 (1887); Greenwood Loan & Guar. Ass'n v. Williams, 72 S.C.
421, 51 S.E. 272 (1905). The non-assuming grantee not being liable for the
debt, no judgment could be obtained against him. Hull v. Young, 29 S.C. 64,
6 S.E. 938 (1888). In order to have immediate sale, deficiency would have to
be waived, yet if it were not waived expressly, personal judgment could not be
obtained even then. What effect would the foreclosure have upon the mort-
gagor? Does Section 45-82 itself preclude subsequent resort to the mortgagor?
Or take a case where the reason that the mortgagor is not joined is that he
1963]
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a matter of logic it would seem that a surrender of the right to a
deficiency would be a surrender or discharge of the debt, which
would relieve not only the party primarily liable-the last as-
suming grantee-but also all those secondarily liable, which
would include the mortgagor and other assuming grantees. It
is to be recognized that in a conflict between federal and state
law, the former prevails, but it would appear inconsistent and
contradictory to say the least, for the Veterans Administration
to consent to waiver by the mortgagee, thereby invoking state
law, and to attempt to negate the effect of the very law it has
invoked. When the mortgagee waived the deficiency and thereby
discharged the debt, it would appear immaterial whether it was
done with the consent of the Veterans Administration or not.
The debt was gone and with it the liability of all the parties,
except as it may have been preserved by the indemnity agree-
ment between the mortgagor and the Veterans Administration,
and this, if it were so, would be limited to them.
Neither below nor on appeal was there disposition or discus-
sion by the court of the suretyship problems that the case pre-
sented, nor did the parties call the court's attention to them.
Consideration of suretyship rules might or might not have com-
pelled a different result. At least the base deserves to be viewed
in the light of these rules. As has been noted, the relationship
created by the assumption of a mortgage debt is that of principal
and surety.21 In this case the mortgagor, Jones, having conveyed
to Bates, who assumed the debt, the latter became a principal,
the former a surety. When Bates conveyed to Ault, who also
assumed the debt, the latter became the principal, and Bates as
to him a surety. Finally, when Ault conveyed to the Bennetts,
they became the principal and primary debtors and all the others
became sureties, liable ultimately in inverse order. In this situ-
ation the mortgagee waived his claim to a deficiency. Whether
this be regarded as a waiver of deficiency as to all the debtors-
and it has been suggested that it was-or whether it be regarded
as a waiver of deficiency against the Bennetts alone, the effect
certainly was to discharge the Bennetts. Under ordinary surety-
is a non-resident, so that no personal judgment in the foreclosure proceeding
could be obtained against him even if he had been named a party-would a
waiver of deficiency free him of liability? Or another case: the mortgagor
conveys to an assuming grantee who alone is sued in an action for foreclosure
and personal judgment resulting in a deficiency, but the defendant does not
ask for an appraisal which might have eliminated the deficiency. How would
this affect the mortgagor?
21. See note 10 supra.
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ship rules the creditor's release of the principal without the con-
sent of the surety discharges the surety. A prime reason for this
result is that the release interferes with the surety's right of sub-
rogation. If the surety, with knowledge of the discharge, pays the
creditor and thereafter sues the principal, the latter's defense
is that since the creditor cannot sue, the surety, succeeding to no
higher right, cannot do so either. Moreover, there being no fur-
ther duty on the part of the principal, the surety "should not be
held to answer for a default of that duty. 2 2 The rule is not
materially different when the suretyship arises from the assump-
tion of a mortgage so that when the mortgagee releases the final
assuming grantee he releases the mortgagor and intermediate
grantees standing in the relation of surety.23 In the present case
the waiver of deficiency, although it may have been intended to
apply only to the last grantee, while not a technical release and
without consideration in the usual sense, was binding because
the statute made it so. If consideration was lacking it was only
in a formal sense and it may well be supplied by the statutory
22. IESTATFMENT, SECuRITY § 122 (1941). "Where the creditor releases a
principal, the surety is discharged unless (a) the surety consents to remain
liable notwithstanding the release, or (b) the creditor in the release reserved
his rights against the surety." Cf. Varnum v. Evans, 2 McMul. L. 409 (S.C.
1842) ; Jackson v. Patrick, 10 S.C. 197 (1878); Waldrop v. Leaman, 30 S.C.
428, 9 S.E. 466 (1888). Where the principal is discharged without reserving
rights against the surety, the surety is not entitled to reimbursement from the
principal. RESTATEmENT, SEcURITy § 110 (1941).
23. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages § 415 (1949) "Where a mortgagor conveys mort-
gaged property to a third person who assumes the debt, the mortgagee, knowing
the facts, ordinarily is bound to treat the mortgagor as surety and to do nothing
to impair his rights as such; and the mortgagor may be released from further
liability in the mortgage debt in the event of a breach of a mortgagee of this
obligation." "Accordingly, the mortgagor has been deemed to be discharged
by the mortgagee's release of the grantee from his personal obligation xx."
To same effect: 37 AM. Jua., Mortgages § 1079 (1941) ; 4 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 5 § 16.141; Annot., 41 A.L.R. 277, 311 (1926),
and supplements. Cf. Scott v. Stone, 149 S.C. 386, 400, 147 S.E. 449 (1928)
where it is said: "As a rule, whenever one for a sufficient consideration
promises to pay his debt to a third person, the promisor becomes the principal
obligor, and the promisee the surety; and if the creditor accepts the promise,
he becomes bound to observe the relation of principal and surety existing be-
tween the parties and hence must not do any act which would impair the
surety's rights." The case involved assumption of a mortgage. The court fol-
lows the quoted statement with this: "Both novation and the relation of prin-
cipal and surety depend upon the same fact-the consent of the mortgagee to
release the mortgagor and look only to his grantee." This is a remarkable
statement so far as it relates to the principal-surety relationship, since if the
mortgagee released the grantor and looked only to the grantee, there would be
only a substituted debtor and no surety. In fact the rule in the mortgage situ-
ations seems to be even stricter against the mortgagee than against an ordinary
creditor: even a reservation of remedies does not prevent discharge of the surety
where there has been an extension of time to the principal. A fortiori it would
appear that the same would be true where there was a reservation accompany-
ing a release. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 5.
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permission to close the sale at once and avoid a court-supervised
appraisal in return for the waiver. At any rate, being binding as
a result of the voluntary act of the mortgagee, an act not passive
in character but positive, the discharge of the principal should
have been effective not only as to the principal but as to the
sureties as well.24 Since last grantees, the Bennetts, had been re-
lieved of personal liability, no one of the prior owners could, on
payment, sue them for reimbursement, any more than could the
mortgagee itself. The mortgagor, despite the indemnity agree-
ment, was a surety, and as between him and the mortgagee, the
mortgagee's discharge of the principal should be treated as
having discharged the mortgagor as well. Similarly the defend-
ant, also a surety, would appear to have been discharged by the
waiver, and if on that account he owed no duty to the mort-
gagee, it is difficult to see how he could be held delinquent in
his promise to the grantor for failing to do what he was no
longer under compulsion to do.
24. It is elemental that in order to effect a valid release, it must be binding-
ordinarily for consideration or under seal. Mere indulgence or failure to act
against a principal does not usually relieve a surety, but positive acts of com-
mission will. Jackson v. Patrick, 10 S.C. 197 (1878).
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